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It is well known that New York City is home to
the largest public housing agency in the nation, the
New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). What
is less well known is that New York is home to what
may become the nation's second largest public hous-
ing program as well.' The Department of Housing
Preservation and Development's (HPD) in rein hous-
ing program oversees 38,958 occupied and 12,714 va-
cant units of housing that have been abandoned by .
their original owners.2 Since 1978, the city has man- David Reiss
aged this dilapidated housing stock and created pro-
grams to transfer properties to the for-profit and non-
profit sectors for lease to low and moderate income tenants.
Programs designed to return this housing to for-profit landlords have
been particularly controversial because of their reliance on the very sector
that abandoned the properties in the first place. One such effort, the
Private Ownership and Management Program (POMP), was terminated
after numerous complaints citing high eviction rates, rental rates unaf-
fordable to low income tenants, and poor management. Criticism came
from many quarters, including tenants and their advocates, the comptrol-
ler's office, and the media. POMP was also subject to extensive litigation.
To replace POMP, the city is instituting a new program, the Neighbor-
hood Entrepreneur Program (NEP). The purpose of this article is to analyze
the structure of NEP in an attempt to predict whether it can avoid the
problems of its predecessor.
Origin of NEP
On September 14, 1994, the Giuliani administration announced a new
initiative called "Building Blocks!," the centerpiece of which involves
conveying HPD buildings to private for-profit managers.' During his cam-
paign, Mayor Giuliani made the privatization of city-owned housing a
focal point of his housing plan. The mayor later stated that by "saving
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millions through the process of divesting itself of property," the city "can,
instead of trying to run property, concentrate on stimulating private own-
ership." ' The mayor hopes that privatization will both reduce municipal
spending in the face of a $3 billion structural budget deficit and stimulate
the economy.5
In the first stage of its initiative, the city intends to shift about 250
apartment buildings containing approximately 2,500 units to private man-
agers over a nine-month period. Of those 2,500 units, 1,000 units will
be conveyed to community-based nonprofits under the Neighborhood
Redevelopment Program (NRP), 500 units will be allocated to tenants
under the Tenant Interim Lease (TIL) program, and the remaining 1,000
units will be turned over to local entrepreneurs under the new Neighbor-
hood Entrepreneurs Program.6
The city has budgeted approximately $50,0007 per unit for renovations
prior to sale. Construction financing for this initiative will be provided
by community development banks. Presumably, long-term funding will
come from a variety of sources that may include section 8 subsidies, special
awards to buildings located in empowerment zones, federal low income
housing tax credits, and federal HOME funds.' Vacant units that are fi-
nanced by city capital funds will be rented at market rates to provide a
source of internal cross-subsidy. 9
Up to 3,000 buildings with 28,000 units eventually may be transferred
through Building Blocks! programs." The city plans to dispose of 8,949
occupied residential units through NRP, 7,458 through TIL, and 11,588
through NEP. It plans to transfer 3,763 vacant residential units through
NEP as well." These three programs are all designed "to sell the buildings
prior to the start of rehabilitation in order to minimize the period of city
ownership and to benefit the tenants with an earlier transfer to private
management and a shorter, more efficient construction period." ' NEP
is clearly the favored program of the three. 3
NEP and POMP Contrasted
NEP is similar to POMP in that it will sell city-owned residential build-
ings to for-profit firms. But NEP is designed to handle smaller buildings
than POMP did. NEP is also funded somewhat differently. Where the
HPD had directly supervised POMP, the city has arranged with the New
York City Housing Partnership, a nonprofit development organization
affiliated with the New York City Chamber of Commerce, to assist in
overseeing the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs and providing them with
technical support."
Whereas POMP concentrated on the disposition of large multifamily
buildings, NEP will focus on selling buildings with eight units on aver-
age. More than one-third of NEP apartments are in buildings of four or
less units, and 70 percent are in buildings with ten units or less. These
smaller buildings are more expensive to administer because they do not
enjoy the same economies of scale as larger buildings.
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The city intends to cluster the sale of vacant and occupied buildings
to encourage block-by-block improvements. These clusters will also allow
the city to mix potentially profitable buildings with those whose rents are
unlikely to cover their costs. 6
NEP plans to contract with a different type of landlord than POMP
did. A common complaint about POMP was that most landlords were
not city residents and instead lived in upstate New York, Long Island,
New Jersey, and Connecticut. 7 Former HPD Commissioner Deborah C.
Wright described a potential NEP purchaser as "the guy, who is a local
superintendent who may want a couple of buildings and live in the ground
floor of one of them."'
NEP will require that the for-profit owners have ties to the neighbor-
hoods in which they buy. 9 These owners must also have experience in
property management and housing renovation. In addition, the city will
concentrate its efforts in targeted areas to maximize program benefits.'
NEP flows from Giuliani's conviction that "[g]overnment intervention
should stimulate and support the private investment required for healthy
real estate markets and communities, not replace it."'" Elaborating on this
vision, former commissioner Wright stated that HPD does not
want to sell property to speculators and people who don't have a long-term
interest in those communities. There are some folks outside the community
who are responsible private owners and we want to give them an opportunity
to participate. [But] we want to try to support the talented local folks who have
the greatest stake in whether or not that community prospers.22
By linking NEP to local business people, the city hopes to bypass problems
associated with absentee landlords and recreate the local real estate net-
work of brokers, owners, and managers that virtually was wiped out in
the 1960s and 1970s when buildings and neighborhoods were abandoned
en masse. Officials expect that hundreds of local jobs will be created as
a byproduct of this plan.'
Wright has stated that no existing legal tenants will be displaced under
the new program. Although rents in occupied apartments will increase,
they will be restructured according to existing HPD guidelines5 and ex-
isting housing subsidies such as rent vouchers and tax credits will cover
the difference between operating expenses and what poor tenants can
afford. 6 Further, HPD intends to use funds from cross-subsidies between
vacant and occupied units to protect existing tenants from displacement.
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Finally, HPD states that tenants have a right to return to their original
building, a promise backed by a written agreement that is to be signed
prior to tenant relocation.2
Summarizing the Giuliani philosophy, former commissioner Wright
described HPD's new goals as moving beyond the mere provision of
housing:
I think many people are missing the point when they focus on for-profit versus
not-for-profit. A person who is a local entrepreneur hires people locally. It's
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going to be in that person's interest because that's where he or she lives and
does business every day.
One of the biggest criticisms of HPD is that so much of the economic power
bypasses local communities. The vendors are from outside of the community.
Many times the developers are. Even some of the consultants are. People are
really emphasizing local participation because we want to harness some of the
power of government expenditure and attract private funds to create jobs and
some economic spin-off.
The Giuliani administration and the Partnership hope to help at least
ten locally-based, for-profit companies become successful owner-man-
agers of low income rental housing in NEP's first year. They also hope
to force the city, private industry, community leaders, and housing advo-
cates to address issues that have been largely ignored since the city
adopted a policy of custodial management for tax-foreclosed residential
property in the late 1970s. They are asking, fundamentally, whether re-
sponsible privately-owned rental housing is feasible in poor neighbor-
hoods.' By highlighting the real estate opportunities in areas affected
by the proposal-Harlem, the South Bronx, and Central Brooklyn-NEP
hopes to bring private sector interest to areas long abandoned by the
traditional real estate market. The Giuliani administration has designed
NEP to test new strategies for stemming the continued abandonment of
property by private owners, thereby reducing costs associated with tax
foreclosure. 1
Building Blocks! is not the sole policy change for Giuliani's HPD. The
Giuliani administration is ideologically opposed to government-adminis-
tered housing programs and is therefore opposed to further vesting of
properties that are in arrears on taxes, water and sewer charges, or both.
This position is supRorted primarily by a study conducted by Arthur An-
dersen Consulting. '
The Andersen study calculated that the overall life cycle cost of the
current (as of July 1994) in rein housing stock is $10.6 billion 33 of which
$4.4 billion is expended to prepare properties for return to private manage-
ment. The study found that buildings taken through the in rein process
stay with the city for manyyears at an average disposition cost of more than
$2.2 million per building. It concluded that most of the in rein properties
returned to private management "will never become positive revenue gen-
erators over the useful life of the capital improvements which the city hasfunded.""5
As a result of these findings, the Giuliani administration intends to
end or minimize the vesting of buildings for arrearages.' The administra-
tion's in rei policy is based on the following objectives: to maximize the
city's real estate tax revenue, to maximize preservation of the affordable
housing stock while minimizing the city's exposure, and to seek long-term
solutions to improve housing viability. 7
To further these goals, the city is also investing $573 million in financial
and technical assistance programs for private landlords "to prevent aban-
donment of privately-owned buildings and forestall their entry into city
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ownership."' These programs include an early warning system to identify
buildings in imminent danger of abandonment and a small property own-
ers' advocacy unit that will allow landlords themselves to identify build-
ings in arrears.39
This policy change comes at the same time Finance Department data
reveal that tax foreclosure filings increased by nearly 30 percent in 1993.
The redemption rate, which was over 90 percent for years, has plum-
meted.' While the Giuliani policies are intended to keep the city out of
the business of managing housing, they are coming at a time when the
low income housing market is particularly fragile.
Structure of NEP
The NEP plan divides responsibility among HPD, community organiza-
tions, tenants, Neighborhood or Local Task Forces, community develop-
ment banks, the Department of Business Services, and the Partnership.
HPD is responsible for selecting sites and planning, designating owners/
managers, obtaining rehabilitation financing, rent restructuring and rental
subsidies, obtaining tax abatements, acting as property disposition om-
budsman for small property owners, providing operating support during
the net lease period (prior to actual sale to the Entrepreneur), and structur-
ing overall project financing.41
Community organizations will be responsible for clustering buildings
to achieve stabilization, implementing tenant training and support, and
monitoring building progress. Tenants are expected to develop tenant
associations, participate in neighborhood redevelopment activities, mobi-
lize community resources and programs, and organize building watches
and neighborhood security. The Neighborhood Task Forces will assist in
site selection and planning, assist in identifying potential owners and
managers, provide input on their qualifications, and give ongoing feed-
back to participants.4 Community development banks will underwrite
the rehabilitation financing, participate in project financing, service reha-
bilitation loans, and inspect and monitor construction. The Department
of Business Services will conduct outreach to potential contractors, sub-
contractors, and suppliers, and make business loans.43
The New York City Housing Partnership is a subsidiary of the New
York City Partnership, a citywide nonprofit organization affiliated with
the Chamber of Commerce. In 1988, the Partnership initiated the Neigh-
borhood Builders Program that sought to increase the participation of
minority contractors and community-based entrepreneurs in the af-
fordable housing industry.45 The Partnership has developed a two-part
plan for its role in NEP based on its experience with Neighborhood Build-
ers.' The first component is entitled "Community-Based Planning and
Monitoring of Performance." The second is entitled "Technical and Finan-
cial Assistance to Neighborhood Business." 47
The community-based planning component will coordinate Neighbor-
hood Task Force activities. The task forces are to meet with community
boards, community-based nonprofit groups, local boards of Realtors, and
business associations. Their most important responsibility, however, will
be evaluating the progress of participating Entrepreneurs. Community-
based nonprofits will be the anchor for these task forces because of their
established credibility with tenants and familiarity with neighborhood
problems and resources.
In addition to monitoring building progress, the task forces will work
with tenants and area residents on employment initiatives. The Partner-
ship has received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation to create an
Employment Pilot Program that will link unemployed tenants with entry-
level construction and management jobs in NEP buildings. Social service
providers affiliated with Neighborhood Task Forces will assess the em-
ployment readiness and training needs of participating tenants."
The "Technical and Financial Assistance to Neighborhood Business"
component of the plan will be modeled on the Partnership's Neighbor-
hood Builders Program. 4 The Partnership will organize mentoring and
industry support, access to financing, and other assistance to prospective
owner-managers. The Partnership will also form an Industry Advisory
Group, composed of bankers and representatives from both the citywide
and neighborhood-based real estate industries, that will assist in structur-
ing the financial, technical assistance, and mentoring package."
Neighborhood Entrepreneurs
Generally, Neighborhood Entrepreneurs must meet certain minimum
criteria, though HPD and the Partnership have the authority to waive these
requirements." Entrepreneurs must be based in one of the communities
targeted by NEP;5 ' currently manage at least fifty units, or have managed
an average of fifty units over the last three years;5 3 own or have a substan-
tial ownership interest in no more than 250 units;' and demonstrate a
capacity to manage another 100 units in the area.' Those applicants with
histories of poor management will be disqualified.' Once these criteria
are met, applicants are evaluated based on management experience and
capacity, financial ability and capacity, rehabilitation experience, ability
to work with government and community organizations, and "other"
considerations (such as whether the applicant has long-term ties to the
neighborhood).57 HPD weighs residential management experience and
"other" considerations most heavily. Financing ability and capacity, reha-
bilitation experience, and ability to work with government and community
organizations are given somewhat less weight."
When an Entrepreneur is accepted, the city prepares plans and specifi-
cations for rehabilitation. Soon thereafter, HPD turns building manage-
ment over to the Entrepreneur, who receives a development fee-not to
exceed 10 percent of the project cost.59 HPD then temporarily transfers
the building title to the nonprofit Neighborhood Partnership Housing
Development Fund Corporation created by the Partnership.'
Neighborhood Entrepreneurs must make up to a three-year commit-
ment to manage properties under the supervision of HPD and the Partner-
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ship prior to taking title. 1 During that time, HPD and the Partnership
will evaluate the quality and timeliness of the construction work. The
Entrepreneur must complete monthly fiscal reports that include rent bill-
ings, rent collection, legal actions, occupancy statistics, total income and
expenses for each building, and monthy management reports that track
tenant complaints and their resolution. 2
Entrepreneurs who successfully rehabilitate and manage these build-
ings will be entitled to purchase them. At the time of purchase and after
rent restructuring, rent stabilization laws will again apply.' HPD and the
Partnership expect that the package of rents, subsidies, and debt will
be structured to permit Entrepreneurs both adequate cash flow and a
reasonable return on their investment.' HPD will retain the right to ap-
prove any future sale of the project for fifteen years to deter short-term
speculation and maintain the housing as a resource for targeted popula-
tions.'
Implementation
Neighborhoods chosen for NEP's first-year demonstration project are
located in the South Bronx, Central, and East Harlem, and Brooklyn's
Bedford Stuyvesant and Crown Heights.' HPD and the Partnership
jointly issued a Request for Qualification (RFQ) inviting potential Entre-
preneurs to compete for the first 1,000 units.' HPD received ninety com-
pleted applications by the November 1994 due date.' Eleven companies
were selected for first-round participation 9 and seventy-nine buildings
were scheduled for transfer to NEP in April and May 1995.7
NEP's implementation has not been fully consistent with its design.
HPD and the Partnership have already waived some elements of the selec-
tion criteria. Although the RFQ and other documents indicate that a history
of serious building code violations will act as a bar,7' this has been waived
in a number of cases. NEP profiles indicate that in some cases an Entrepre-
neur "inherited" violations from a previous owner and has plans to correct
them.' However, research by the Task Force on City-Owned Housing
indicates that many Entrepreneurs own or manage buildings with a sub-
stantial history of code violations, which were not acknowledged by HPD
and the Partnership in their profile. 3
Several of the landlords also owe tens of thousands of dollars in tax
arrears on other buildings in their portfolios.74 Furthermore, half of the
first group of Entrepreneurs have business addresses that are not located
within their cluster, indicating that they are not truly "local." Only one
Entrepreneur manages fewer than 100 units and at least two manage more
than 2,000 units, a far cry from the "superintendent" model that Wright
had earlier proposed.'m
A View fron One Neighborhood
Sarah Hovde, a researcher at the Community Service Society, con-
ducted a study of the first stages of NEP in Central Harlem for her master's
thesis at Columbia University. 7 Hovde found that the NEP model tenta-
tively has been accepted by community groups involved in the Neighbor-
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hood Task Force and that criticism has been muted when compared to
that directed at POMP.
Potential NEP building clusters were identified by HPD and the Partner-
ship in January 1995. The Central Harlem Neighborhood Task Force chose
two out of the four site clusters HPD presented to it."Tenants in identified
buildings received letters in late January and early February telling them
they could opt out by applying to TIL.' HPD presented its choice of Entre-
preneurs to the Neighborhood Task Force as an accomplished fact. Some
task force members objected to this, but HPD did not reconsider its deci-
sion. HPD claimed that NEP's time frame required speedy action.7
The Central Harlem Neighborhood Task Force meetings are not open
to the public and members complained to Hovde that HPD tightly controls
the agenda. As a result, some members have had their own monthly ad
hoc meetings without HPD present. The members interviewed by Hovde
describe their relationships with HPD as cooperative, although there has
been some uneasiness and conflict. Generally, it appears that local players
want to remain within the NEP process to exert some influence.
Evaluations of NEP
NEP is currently in its early stages but various groups already are ex-
pressing familiar concerns. The city and its allies have, of course, presented
NEP in the best possible light. But commentators have pointed to what
they would characterize as design flaws and implementation problems
evident even in NEP's early, highly public stages. Members of the Task
Force on City-Owned Housing, in particular, have pointed to aspects of
NEP that are similar to POMP's design and implementation.
Self-Assessinent by the City
NEP is based on the assumption that the city can supervise efficiently
the disposition of buildings and that locally based owner-managers are
uniquely qualified to make small buildings profitable, employ tenants,
rebuild the neighborhood economy, and utilize local contractors and sup-
pliers.8  Kathryn Wylde, head of the New York City Housing Partnership,
stated that the
city has been owner and manager of some of this housing for almost 20 years.
Not only has it been a drain on the city but it has kept small owners from
building housing markets in their neighborhoods. With our program of technical
and financial support for entrepreneurs and the subsidies for tenants, neighbor-
hoods can be revived.82
The Partnership plan acknowledges that rent rolls are inadequate for
maintenance, rehabilitation costs are high, and buildings are too small to
achieve economies of scale. It further recognizes that many of the tenants
are formerly homeless people (many of whom were denied permanent
housing developed by private or nonprofit developers under various city
programs), and many of the affected neighborhoods have a shortage of
local property owners. 3
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The city and the Partnership hope that NEP will address these prob-
lems. The city wishes to increase local capacity to manage, maintain, and
finance these small residential and mixed-use properties. It also intends
to complement the housing plan with strategies to fight drugs, crime, and
other quality of life battles." The city expects the Neighborhood Task
Forces to coordinate these efforts and the Partnership to organize support
from industry and business leaders, who will provide the necessary men-
toring, technical assistance, and financial backing.8"
The Partnership plan distinguishes NEP from POMP. It criticized
POMP for excluding small, local firms. It also criticized POMP for failing
to educate and protect existing tenants, whose cooperation is essential to
execute tenant-in-place rehabilitation. Finally, it criticized POMP because
its funding levels were insufficient either to rehabilitate adequately units
that could command higher rents or to maintain proportionality between
after-rehabilitation rents and costs low income tenants can afford. Mayor
Giuliani noted that, in the past, the lack of comprehensive planning had
interfered with effective neighborhood rejuvenation: "[O]ur tremendous
successes have been diluted by an often uncoordinated development ap-
proach. As a result, despite extensive investment in homeownership and
rental housing, communities remained scarred by scattered City-owned
buildings and lots.""' It remains to be seen whether NEP actually avoids
the problems that bedeviled POMP.
Business-Centered Advocacy Commnunity
The business-centered advocacy community has made little comment
about NEP, although the Citizens Housing and Planning Council notes
that there exists "skepticism about whether inexperienced entrepreneurs
can handle difficult rehabilitation projects with tenants in place."r7 A prin-
cipal of one of Harlem's largest real estate companies stated that "[l]ocal
entrepreneurs are best able to manage these buildings . .. [b]ut if it's
going to work, whoever takes the buildings will have to have an easier
time removing some of the tenants. Some don't pay rent; some tear up
apartinents. You have to get better tenants." ' Overall, though, there has
been little commentary from these quarters.
Tenant-Centered Advocacy Comnmunity
Many members of the tenant-centered advocacy community who criti-
cized POMP also criticized NEP. Yet, some community voices tentatively
support NEP and the landlords chosen for the first round.
When NEP was first announced, Harry DeRienzo of the Task Force
on City-Owned Housing questioned the long-term affordability of the
program:
What happens when the city is out of the picture? Gradually, the housing
opportunities for the working poor will be lost. It is not feasible for for-profit
owners to operate housing where tenants earn, on average, less than $7,000 a
year. The only way that this program can work is if much of it is eventually
rented at market rates.89
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Professor Susan Saegert, also a task force member, "worried that there is
not more tenant participation" in NEP's design.?o Sarah Hovde's research
supports Saegert's concerns about local participation. 9' Hovde documents
how the implementation of NEP is partially at odds with its "community
participation" model. HPD is implementing NEP in a "top-down" man-
ner that conflicts with its stated procedures. However, Hovde's findings
should not be overstated; all of those groups asked to participate in the
Central Harlem Neighborhood Task Force agreed to do so, albeit with
some trepidation.?
Michele Cotton, another task force member, made preliminary findings
regarding the design and implementation of the Building Blocks! program
as a whole. 93 She notes that the Giuliani administration has stopped plac-
ing homeless families in in rei housing. While this may benefit other
needy populations, homeless families are left with diminishing housing
resources in the city.? Cotton remarks that the effects of this policy change
are compounded by the Giuliani administration's decision to keep in rein
apartments vacant to make NEP more attractive financially. These changes
combine to exacerbate the housing shortage emergency in New York City
for low income households.
Cotton also finds that key aspects of NEP's design are substantially
similar to elements of POMP. NEP landlords are not required to be much
more "local" than POMP landlords were (POMP landlords, too, were
required to have some experience with the program's type of housing stock
and were allowed to buy only buildings near their current properties).
Monitoring standards may not be substantially different either, particu-
larly in light of recent severe staffing cuts at HPD. 9
Some voices in the tenant-centered advocacy community are cautiously
positive. In addition to those interviewed by Hovde, City Limits inter-
viewed community organizers who indicated that they welcomed NEP
and some of the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs.' Perhaps what is most
striking about the tenant-centered advocacy community's comments re-
garding NEP is the lack of both stridency in its tone and prejudgments
regarding NEP's success. Besides certain structural arguments about the
role of NEP within the greater housing market and other concerns about
failures in its design, few commentators have dismissed NEP out of hand.
Future debates will center around its implementation.
Analysis and Conclusion
Even at this early stage, it appears that NEP, like POMP, may not meet
initial expectations. NEP also must be compared to other in rein programs
before any final judgments are made. All HPD programs have been seri-
ously flawed; even the widely praised TIL program offers no panacea.
New York City has been unable to respond equitably and efficiently to
its acute housing crisis for low income households.
There is no question that HPD listened to many of the programmatic
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criticisms directed against POMP. NEP is designed to increase local input
in its implementation, and its structure includes many forms of monitoring
that appear more effective than those found in POMP. NEP also coordi-
nates with other city initiatives by ensuring that blocks and neighborhoods
are targeted for revitalization through the clustering of sales. Also, HPD
is seriously considering long-term affordability issues by weighing the
use of tax, sewage, and water charge abatements.
It is clear that NEP remains quite similar to POMP in overall philosophy
and design. The tensions between POMP's design and goals also exist
within NEP: profits versus affordability, speed versus efficiency, and
involvement versus apathy. These tensions undermined POMP. Prelimi-
nary evaluations of NEP reveal some disturbing findings-even in this care-
fully scrutinized first-round qualifications outlined in the RFQ have been
waived and community participation has been only tentative.' Like POMP,
NEP may be exposed to legal challenges as a result of these problems.
Local Input
In response to the concern that POMP sold buildings to slumlords with
no connection to the neighborhood, HPD has designed NEP to maximize
local participation. As noted above, former Commissioner Wright made
this approach a central element of her design for NEP. Yet, this too is
fraught with potential problems. Wright assumes that NEP can remain
local where POMP did not. This assumes that POMP ignored potential
local buyers in favor of outsiders. The validity of this assumption is unclear
and NEP requirements further confuse the issue. By requiring certain
levels of experience and capital, Wright will exclude the local "superinten-
dent" she described as the typical participant in the program, and invite
the type of "entrepreneur" POMP attracted.
The NEP design contains points of entry through which the POMP
landlord may return. A "local" Entrepreneur is defined as someone who
has run a substantial business in one of the areas for a number of years.
Many POMP landlords fit this definition. Even more, HPD can waive
any eligibility requirement at any time. While some of the first round
Neighborhood Entrepreneurs may prove to be good choices, the flexibility
of the current guidelines can become a source of concern.
If truly local Entrepreneurs are scarce, HPD may be forced to rely on
POMP landlords and their peers. However, NEP, modeled on the Neigh-
borhood Builders Program, is designed to provide greater support to land-
lords than POMP provided. Therefore, NEP may actually expand the pool
of truly local landlords by assisting those who would not have qualified
under POMP.
Monitoring
NEP is designed to improve monitoring in a number of ways. The
nonprofit Partnership will oversee the monitoring of the entire program.
Local nonprofit groups will contract to monitor for-profit landlords. Where
the Partnership and some Neighborhood Task Force members may have
a conflict of interest monitoring NEP because they receive monies from
HIPD, those members without HPD contracts, such as Community Board
representatives, can act as independent community monitors."
On paper, NEP's design meets many of the criticisms regarding moni-
toring that had been leveled against POMP. However, Hovde's research
indicates that the Neighborhood Task Forces have not found a voice inde-
pendent of HPD, and Cotton has noted that staffing cuts at HPD are likely
to interfere with proper monitoring of NEP. To be successful, monitoring
must be funded and its findings acted upon. Only time will tell whether
NEP's monitors are effective and whether their findings are heeded by
decision makers.
Cost/Benefit Analysis of NEP
Do for-profit landlords actually provide housing more cheaply than
nonprofit groups, tenant cooperatives, and HPD? If not, is NEP the most
cost-effective model of housing management for the in rein stock? Many
assume that a less regulated and subsidized market is the best way to
deliver housing services, but this claim has not been substantiated in the
context of New York City's unique housing market. As the 1993 Housing
and Vacancy Survey indicates, about 60 percent of the apartments that
are affordable to low income families in New York City are either publicly
owned or subsidized." Many of the suppliers receive government subsid-
ies for capital improvements and operating expenses through direct grants
and various abatements. Roughly one-third of New York's low income
households have very low incomes and receive government subsidies."°
The costs associated with in rein housing are substantial. They include
the direct costs of rehabilitation and operation subsidies. On disposition,
these costs may be offset by expected revenues to the city for taxes, mort-
gage payments, and water and sewer fees; savings from reduced operating
costs; and the receipt of otherwise unavailable monies from federal CDBG
funds that are used for rehabilitation. Yet, whether NEP is an efficient
use of city and federal monies remains to be seen.
New York City plays a unique role in the life of the United States. As
a frequent point of arrival for immigrants,' and destination both to those
who want to "make it here" and those who crave anonymity, the city
continues to draw people despite its perceived inhabitability. Because of
these unique features, reliance on simplistic economic markets is inappo-
site for analyses of the New York City housing market."°2 Empirical re-
search should replace ideology in the search for an answer to the following
question: Can NEP landlords provide the best services at the best price
or will New York City taxpayers provide these landlords with a subsidy
that euphemistically is labelled "profit"? Put another way, if NEP land-
lords are making an 8 percent profit, are they actually that much more
efficient than other housing managers?"3
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Coordination with Other Government and Community Efforts
As noted above, Mayor Giuliani criticized earlier HPD disposition pro-
grams because they failed to integrate service delivery with other city
programs."' Many commentators agree with this criticism. Some note
that drugs and crime have overwhelmed in rent buildings, particularly
those that are not fully occupied. 0 5 Others suggest that various regulatory
and legal systems, such as the housing code and landlord/tenant law,
overwhelm attempts to transfer city-owned housing to for-profit and non-
profit organizations. Potential liability for asbestos and lead paint also
have reduced the attractiveness of city-owned housing."
NEP attempts to address some of these problems by siting many re-
sources in small areas. By clustering vacant buildings with occupied ones,
NEP seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it seeks to create a critical mass
of reinvestment in a small geographic area. Second, it seeks to provide
valuable financial incentives to potential landlords that may offset poten-
tial liability and regulatory costs." Finally, other components of Building
Blocks! are applied to complement these efforts by assisting small land-
lords in the neighborhoods targeted by NEP.
Yet, whether NEP will be successful in integrating services with those
delivered by other city agencies and efforts remains unclear. Furthermore,
the concentration of limited resources may disproportionately benefit a
few at the expense of neighboring communities. Such a policy may ensure
the success of a neighborhood program at the expense of a successful
citywide effort.
NEP and the New York City Housing Market
In assessing the role of NEP in the New York City housing market, it
should be compared to other HPD in ren programs as well as to programs
through which the city does not assume ownership of in ren properties.
Efforts must be made to establish the true cost, not just the direct subsidy
cost, of these privatization efforts. The true cost includes an increase in
homelessness as a result of higher rents. It also includes the benefits of
neighborhood revitalization, and the concomitant increase in local indus-
try and jobs.
There is little direct evidence as to whether NEP will increase home-
lessness in New York City, although some data suggest such a conclusion."
If renter households living below the poverty line constitute 26.9 percent of
all households and if apartments affordable to these households comprise
only 18.9 percent of the total housing stock, there is reason to believe that
programs reducing the amount of housing available to low income house-
holds will lead to an increase in homelessness. The same logic applies when
one considers the vacancy rate for apartments affordable to poor house-
holds: about 0.58 percent for apartments renting under $300 a month and
1 percent for apartments renting between $300 and $500 a month."° The
number of apartments renting at less than $400 per month fell from 19,400
in 1984 to 15,951 in 1987 to 9,249 in 1991 to 3,914 in 1993. "0 Any program
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that reduces the stock of affordable housing will have a marked impact on
apartment availability for low income tenants.
On the other hand, a program that leads to neighborhood revitalization,
as NEP is designed to do, may attract additional capital and have the
secondary effect of encouraging more housing construction. This, of
course, is what Mayor Giuliani and former Commissioner Wright hope
NEP will accomplish, Wright emphatically believes that the local commu-
nity is better able to capture other externalities in the form of secondary
industries and jobs if local people are selected through NEP. Free market
advocates tend to support this hypothesis.'11 Again, there is little direct
evidence that this will occur, but it is an intuitive conclusion that could be
confirmed empirically. The NEP model is only compelling if its secondary
effects are greater than those of other city programs.
Of course, other HPD in ren programs such as TIL, Community Man-
agement Program (CMP)," 2 and Central Management"' also are flawed.
TIL has been criticized for its problem with tax and fee arrears, slower
outtake rate, and its ability to absorb buildings with varied profiles. CMP
and its later reincarnations have had only mixed success and popularity.
Central Management also has been roundly criticized and few champion
its ability to manage housing, particularly given the city's manifest unwill-I 4
ingness to invest sufficient funding and personnel. In terms of rapid
disposition, a concern of great importance to the Giuliani administration,
NEP holds promise. From the perspective of tenant satisfaction, NEP's
predecessor, POMP, performed poorly in some neighborhoods and satis-
factorily in others, indicating that the model is sensitive to the choices of
contractors, location, and building type. However, only TIL buildings and
sold co-ops have consistently outperformed POMP in tenant satisfaction.
The NEP model can also be compared to a policy in which the city
does not take possession of tax and fee foreclosed housing. Such a policy
may become reality in the near future. The Giuliani administration plans
to provide preventive assistance to landlords facing foreclosure for tax and
fee arrears, to stop vesting, and to sell securitized tax liens on foreclosed
housing. While the city proposes these initiatives as novel solutions to
the problem of abandonment, they are quite similar to previous unofficial
moratoria on vesting and auction programs. Such programs have failed.
The sale of buildings through auctions cannot bridge New York City's
gap between the housing needs of its many low income households and
the availability of affordable and decent housing. Auctions merely protect
the city from the costs associated with vesting and leave low income citi-
zens to deal with the problems inherent in the in rem housing stock.
No in rein strategy offers a magic solution. Such programs are merely
alternative responses to the inexorable abandonment of housing that New
York City has faced over the last thirty years. Some may be more efficient
than others, but they are fundamentally identical. Each attempts to place
abandoned housing in the hands of those who supposedly can manage
it more cheaply and/or effectively than the city is willing or able to manage
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it. Programs that avoid vesting differ from current in rein strategies in that
they do not remove the financial costs of rehabilitating the aging housing
stock from landlords. Nor do they alleviate the social costs borne by occu-
pants of substandard in rein housing and by those who are homeless as
a result of continuing abandonment. Someone will have to bear the costs
of a deteriorating housing stock-either the cost of improving it or the
cost of living with it.
NEP and the Lazo
NEP seems vulnerable to many of the same legal challenges as POMP.
Tenant-centered advocates also are concerned that NEP has not yet prom-
ulgated rules that comply with the new charter's more expansive notice
and opportunity-to-be-heard provisions."' The Task Force on City-Owned
Property's In Rein Organizer's Son rcebook indicates that NEP's rules and
regulations may not survive legal challenges."6 NEP's failure to provide
an official opportunity for tenants to comment on rent increases, to contest
final selection into NEP, and to contest NEP's programmatic rent restruc-
turing may violate the due process standards of Union of City Tenants v.
Koch. The unofficial NEP guidelines contained in its RFQ grant complete
discretion to HPD regarding important matters, such as the qualification
of Neighborhood Entrepreneurs."' As with POMP, courts may invalidate
NEP guidelines that grant complete discretion to the city.
While NEP apparently addresses the needs of current "legal" tenants
by providing rental subsidies, it makes no promises for future tenants. 19
The fate of future tenants is a primary concern of the advocacy commu-
nity. 1'" Potential in rein tenants may have standing to bring lawsuits against
the city. 2'
Sarah Hovde raises legal questions regarding NEP's innovative public-
private structure. The significant administrative and policy-making role
of the Partnership, a private entity, in NEP, a city program, is unprece-
dented." The Partnership's role and its accountability to the public are
not clearly defined. Without a proactive stance by the city, provision of
such clarity may be left to the courts.
Future of NEP
NEP either will be an innovative program that has addressed commu-
nity and legal concerns or it will be POMP redux. Viewed from the perspec-
tive of one who primarily favors rapid disposition, it may be an effective
strategy, if it is not blocked by the courts or by public outcry. Viewed from
the perspective of one who favors tenant and community participation, it
shares many similarities with POMP.
Some of its innovations include: It is better funded than POMP; it is
designed to have and does have more community participation than
POMP; it provides explicit protection to tenants who must relocate during
rehabilitation; it increases the potential number and types of monitors of
participating landlords; and, perhaps tellingly, it has generally avoided
negative press so far.
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But since it has many characteristics in common with POMP, it may
be similarly criticized in the future. Like POMP, NEP does not ensure
that its units will be maintained as long-term housing for low and moderate
income tenants;" may encourage evictions of tenants paying low rents;
and does not ensure tenants adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard. HPD has already waived some of NEP's own guidelines in the
first year.
NEP has some new characteristics that may render it less successful
than POMP. It keeps apartments vacant in a city with an overwhelming
need for more low income housing. Also, it fails to meet the needs of
homeless families. These characteristics may lead to debilitating legal chal-
lenges or future unpopularity.
Finally, some of NEP's first Entrepreneurs are from outside the local
community for which they have been selected. Some have poor records
of maintaining housing, as evidenced by their housing code violations.
Moreover, some have substantial property tax arrears. The first round
does not engender complete faith in NEP's implementation strategy.
NEP was first presented as a program that would spur the private sector
to redevelop abandoned housing in poor communities. While its design
appears to have incorporated lessons from POMP, its predecessor, it is
unclear whether those changes will be sufficient to achieve NEP's goals.
NEP's first year of operation demonstrates that it is superior to POMP in
some ways, but it is unclear whether those improvements will help NEP
meet the goals that the Giuliani administration has enunciated and the
need of New York City residents for decent affordable housing.
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